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abstract
This article seeks to clarify the concepts of risk and uncertainty, restricting its focus to environmental
problems and to three strands of reflection. Firstly, I suggest that we should apply the label riscophrenia to
the tendency to envisage most environmental problems excessively in terms of probabilistic risk, erect-
ing the concept to a core dogma of certainty based on the image it offers of (alleged) safety and control of
the random. Looking at the most serious environmental problems of the twenty-first century through
the prism of “animal spirits” is above all an exercise which shows that unpredictability and uncertainties
are constituent elements of human existence and social life. Secondly, I argue that the assessment of
uncertainty has political and normative implications. I hold that uncertainty may make it possible to
invoke precautionary, not just preventive, measures, and that alternative “contextualised” research strat-
egies, open to a variety of points of view, are possible. Lastly, I claim that the language of risk and its
excessive application is generally laden with a type of ambiguity which tends not to emphasize society’s
current problems, and so facilitates the continuation rather than the questioning of our society’s domi-
nant technocratic and technological model.
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Introduction
Modernity’s claims to be able to tame uncertainty, which some thought could be real-
ized through the achievements of science, statistics and probability,1 have turned out
to be a failure. All aspects of individual and collective life are in the final analysis per-
meated with random elements which cannot be controlled in a rational manner. The
notion of control and the rejection of contingencies continue to exist, but they are con-
tradicted by the need to acknowledge not only that uncertainties have not gone away,
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1 On the emergence of statistical reasoning and probability, see Hacking (1975; 1990), Porter (1986), Krüger et al.
(1987) and Cohen (2005).
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but also by a widespread perception that in a complex and increasingly interdependent
world they have returned in strength. Unpredictability is the hallmark of many of the
problems we face in the twenty-first century, engendered or influenced by human
action often associated with technological and technocratic choices. The common ele-
ment in these problems is the potentially irreversible nature of the synergistic and
trans-generational consequences and effects of technological decisions.
The attempt to control uncertainty was reflected above all in the introduction of
the idea of measurable, calculable risk which could be subjected to the utilitarian logic
of cost-benefit analysis, so characteristic of the modern cultural context. Although the
origins of the idea of risk lie in the daring undertakings of maritime trade and in exter-
nal factors that might jeopardize any voyage,2 such as storms and pirate attacks, it sub-
sequently came to be associated with voluntary decision-making based on potential
gains and losses, and the magnitude of the consequences of that decision-making. The
act of interpreting the world in terms of risk supposedly made it more understandable,
freed it from the powers of mystery, and made it immune to the capriciousness of the
gods and the inexorability of destiny. Even if the concept of risk involved acknowledg-
ing uncertainty, that uncertainty could be tamed by forecasts and by scientific and tech-
nological control. Against this conception, the notion of risk is in fact a secularized
version of the goddess Fortuna, who was venerated in antiquity and personified chance
and randomness (cf. García, 2006) although, given the probabilistic basis for the use
of the concept, it cannot account for complex problems such as the environmental,
which may include global warming, biodiversity loss, chemical contaminants, and ge-
netically engineered food crops, amongst others.
This article seeks to clarify the concepts of risk and uncertainty, restricting its
focus to environmental problems. This approach is justified by the fact that among the
many areas in which the concept of risk predominates, the environment is the one
which features radically uncertain phenomena which generate unimaginably complex
systems. It is worth stressing that the majority of environmental problems are the re-
sult of the unforeseeable effects of technological innovation, encouraged by humani-
ty’s desire to control, tame and exploit nature. However, this does not mean that all
technologies are harmful to the environment, and there may well be environmental
problems which derive from the intrinsic randomness of the natural world. In devel-
oping this article I begin by suggesting that we should apply the label riscophrenia to the
tendency to envisage most environmental problems excessively in terms of probabilistic
2 Although the origin of the term risk is relatively unknown and thus controversial, most commentators associate
it with the language of maritime trade and insurance (cf. Luhmann 1993 [1991]; Lupton, 1999; Martínez, 1999;
Strydom, 2002).
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risk, erecting the concept to a core dogma of certainty based on the image it offers of
(alleged) safety and control of the random. Events have been looked at from a quanti-
tative, cost-benefit point of view, which makes it possible to link them to the process of
commodification. The trust which modern society places in such forecasts encourages
the taking of risks which would otherwise not be taken. It is precisely in this context
that I draw on John Maynard Keynes’ concept of “animal spirits”, to recall that social
life in general (which includes economic life, to which Keynes was referring in par-
ticular) is not governed by strict principles of rationality, and we cannot therefore rel-
egate to the background other existential and contextual areas of unpredictability and
randomness. Secondly, I argue that the assessment of uncertainty has political and
normative implications. I hold that uncertainty may make it possible to invoke pre-
cautionary (not just preventive) measures, and that alternative “contextualised” re-
search strategies, open to a variety of points of view, are possible. As a final thought, I
argue that the language of risk and its excessive application – riscophrenia – is gener-
ally laden with a type of ambiguity which tends not to emphasize society’s current prob-
lems, and so facilitates the continuation rather than the questioning of our society’s
dominant technocratic and technological model.
1 The unavoidable nature of uncertainty and its commodification
In an essay published at a time when there was a boom in studies adopting the term
“risk” as a key concept for examining modern-day society, which had been largely
brought about by the translation into English of Ulrich Beck’s Risk society (1992 [1986]),
the Portuguese sociologist Hermínio Martins reminds us of the conceptual distinction
between probabilistic risk and non-probabilistic uncertainty, formulated by Frank
Knight and John Maynard Keynes in the 1920s, and he argues: “If we take seriously the
predominantly economic terms in which risk is interpreted, the expression ‘risk soci-
ety’ might suggest to us (more) a society which rationalizes technological dangers, like
all others, by drawing up an ever increasing number of models of cardinal probability
(…), rather than a society which suffers existential anxiety over its obligations to fu-
ture generations” (2011 [1998], p. 196-7). As the author explains, the perplexity in this
statement derives from a certain barely comprehensible mimicry on the part of soci-
ologists who were theorizing about a fin de siècle situation, and the strong tendency in
the economic mainstream to devalue uncertainty. The fact that the future was com-
bined with the idea of probabilistic risk meant that traditional ideas of the social world
as something radically uncertain and indeterminate were disregarded.
Before it expanded in macro-sociological terms, thanks to Beck and other writ-
ers who developed their theories around the notion of “reflexive modernization,” the
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idea of risk had been used in “risk assessments” and “cost-benefit analyses” and widely
applied by experts and regulators (mostly engineers, planners and economists) to the
design of relatively structured mechanical systems such as nuclear and chemical plants,
and aircraft and aerospace technologies (cf. Wynne, 1992). The work of those writers
now extended the notion to the study of unstructured, disparate problems, from cli-
mate change to transnational terrorist networks. At the same time, the idea was appro-
priated by a broader range of actors concerned with the acceptance of risk and the per-
ception of ambivalence and insecurity in connection with technical advances (cf.
Strydom, 2002). Risk thus made a devastating entrance into the language of the acad-
emy, politics, the media and the public at large, with the result that many aspects of
today’s way of life and social organization came to be designated, described and ana-
lysed using the term “risk”. A kind of riscophrenia arose,3 an excessive tendency or
irresistible attraction to the probabilistic concept of risk, based on an image of the
putative safety and control over the random and the contingent, which represents a
culture which denies chance. Risk became a kind of totem deeply embedded in the logic
of the advanced modern-day world, and gained traction in a large quantity and diver-
sity of theoretical and empirical studies, specialised journals, academic courses, re-
search centres, international conferences, etc.
A certain frenzy surrounding the notion of risk led to the erroneous redefini-
tion, as risks, of some issues which are effectively uncertainties, as we shall see below.
This redefinition came wrapped in a cloak of ambiguity, in that the language of risk was
used to describe problems which go beyond the usual definition of risk – as the likeli-
hood of the occurrence of a certain damaging event multiplied by the intensity of harm
caused by that damage. The very theory of “the risk society”, mentioned earlier, con-
tains an echo of the idea of uncertainty, but does so in the name of risk. In assuming
this dominant role, risk glosses over and relegates uncertainty, and makes it unthink-
able. Restoring the conceptual distinction between risk and uncertainty advanced by
Frank H. Knight (1921) and John Maynard Keynes (1921; 1954 [1936]), in the tense
context of the post-World War One world, enables us to see how misguided that ten-
dency was. While it has been widely developed elsewhere (cf. Reddy, 1996; Martins,
2011 [1998]; Dupuy, 2002),4 it is important to mention succinctly that for those econo-
mist-philosophers, a context of risk is that which can be assessed and calculated in
terms of its numerical probabilities, unlike uncertainty, which cannot be assessed by
3 This is a term which picks up on the celebrated concept of “quantophrenia” developed by Pitirim Sorokim (1956),
a sociologist who in the 1950s denounced American sociology’s ‘cult’ of wanting to transform everything into num-
bers through the introduction of quantitative methods and the logic of measurable events.
4 For a broader perspective on uncertatinty in economic theory, see Greer (2000); Moureau and Rivaud-Danset
(2004).
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measurable calculation. They shared the idea that market actors were confronted with
an irreducible uncertainty which cannot be eliminated by an increase in the amount of
information or a greater application of science, because it is part of the ontologically
contingent, true and unpredictable nature of things (cf. Martins, 2011 [1998], p. 198).5
As a “radically distinct notion”, in the words of Bernstein (1998 [1996], p. 215-
30), uncertainty was in no way suited to the dominant patterns of thought of the time
which sought to make economics “scientific” by studying how this science would be-
have if individuals were completely rational and conducted themselves only on eco-
nomic grounds. While classical theory was right in its analysis of many problems, it
tended to overestimate the stability of the market economy, including those areas in
which results were inevitably uncertain and for which their could not be deterministic
or causal laws governing economic life and decision-making. In order to emphasize
the irreducible uncertainty and volatility of expectations, particularly expectations
about others’ expectations (largely indeterminate), Keynes introduced the notion of
“animal spirits”, an idea which was not received with much enthusiasm at the time.6
“Animal spirits seemed a diabolus ex machina – an artificial element introduced to make
the story come out wrong”, as economist Roger Koppl explains (1991, p. 204). How-
ever, for Keynes, “animal spirits”7 (or “states of mind”,8 instincts, beliefs, compul-
sions, etc.) produced “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as
the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative
probabilities” (Keynes, 1954 [1936], p. 161). The emphasis he gave to “characteristics
of human nature” was justified by the argument that “a large proportion of our positive
activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expecta-
tion” (ibid.). It should be noted, as Robert Skidelsky, the best-known biographer of
Keynes, explains, that Keynesian uncertainty is associated with negative and positive
5 In many books and articles, the priority for the distinction between risk and uncertainty is assigned to Knight’s
Risk, uncertainty and profit, published in 1921, and this pioneering exploration had been followed by Keynes’ master-
work, The general theory of employment, interest and money, published in 1936. However, as Hermínio Martins ex-
plains, the idea of uncertainty was also set out in Keynes’ A treatise on probability, also published in 1921. He used the
term “subjective risk”, which covers a kind of non-calculable and non-insurance risk, instead of “uncertainty” (Mar-
tins, 2011 [1998], p. 197). There is also some controversy as to who is the author of the distinction. Reddy points out
that it was first formulated by J.H.von Thunen, in mid-nineteenth century (Reddy, 1996, p. 226-7).
6 The roots of the concept are to be found in the physiology of the Greek physicians of classical antiquity. Stated
succintly, its etymological origin goes back to Galen (ca. 130-200), for whom animal spirits explained sensation and
movement. Another important figure who used the term was René Descartes, in the seventeenth century. In his
theory, individuals may act independently of reason, or even in opposition to it. Body movements are caused by
movements of animal spirits, but these may be affected by the emotions, the mind or the soul (Koppl, 1991).
7 In A Treatise on probability, Keynes speaks of “whim” (or “caprice”), which later became “animal spirits” in The
general theory of employment, interest and money (cf. Skidelsky, 2010 [2009], p. 128)
8 Some Portuguese economists prefer the term “states of mind” (Alexandre et al., 2009).
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beliefs about the future. None of these can be properly explained because they are sub-
ject to unexpected changes. In Skidelsky’s interpretation of Keynes’ thought, when we
have no way of knowing what will happen in the future, it is rational – and above all
reasonable – to act in accordance with expectations deriving from convention, basic
principles, traditions and habits (2010 [2009], p. 135).
Recognition of uncertainty in general, and the idea that the behaviour of eco-
nomic actors is shaped by factors other than the purely rational and cognitive, has gained
some new life in economic theory in recent years and was indeed the grounds for award-
ing the Nobel Prize for Economics to Georges Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph
Stiglitz (in 2001) and Daniel Kahneman (in 2002). That recognition also occurs with
the resurgence of the Keynesian expression “animal spirits” in the recent context of
the depression which followed the banking and financial crisis which erupted in the
US in 2008 and had repercussions in Europe.9 The failure to foresee the crisis in the
financial markets, which following an explosion of credit led to their asphyxiation, is
due, according to some, to the devaluation of the idea of “animal spirits” in conven-
tional macro-economic theory (Akerlof and Shiller, 2010 [2009]) or, similarly, to “the
inability of the economy to take uncertainty seriously, camouflaging that negligence
with sophisticated mathematical formulae” (Skidelsky, 2010 [2009], p. 252).
Sociology, with its focus on collective action, may help with “endogenizing ‘ani-
mal spirits’” in economic analyses, as argued by Paul DiMaggio. Three reasons may be
pointed out. First, expectations regarding uncertainty are social constructions, in that
they are an attribute of the social system and not of isolated individuals. Beyond un-
derstanding whether investors are rational, it is important to ask how rational they are
as a group. Secondly, expectations, decisions and economic outcomes are all interde-
pendent and, from this point of view, each decision-maker has to take into account the
likely decisions of others. Finally, market actors are dealing with a dual uncertainty:
uncertainty about the future state of the world, and uncertainty about the beliefs of
other investors about the future state of the world (DiMaggio, 2002, p. 84-5).
Looking at the most serious environmental problems of the twenty-first century
through the prism of “animal spirits”, as suggested in this article, is above all an exer-
cise which shows that unpredictability and uncertainties are constituent elements of
human existence and social life, even though this approach may be a daring one in that
it relies on a broader understanding of the concept. In other words, uncertainties do
not simply derive from our epistemological ignorance, rather they are inherent in the
natural world and in social and institutional behaviour. I use “uncertainties” in the
9 The context in which Keynes popularized the expression was also one of crisis. The general theory of employment,
interest and money was published following the Great Depression of 1929.
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plural because, rather than restricting uncertainty to its epistemic aspect (when we
know what the most important parameters of the system are, but not its probability
distributions, because our scientific knowledge is incomplete), we need to acknowl-
edge other types of uncertainty which tend to be subsumed into the concept of risk,
and complement that analysis using sociological variables. Brian Wynne, for example,
offers a typology which, in addition to risk and epistemic uncertainty, includes igno-
rance and indeterminacy. Ignorance is often not recognized and reflects a series of un-
certainties which remain invisible; indeterminacy harks back to the idea of an explana-
tory receptiveness arising from the contingencies inherent in social and institutional
behaviour (cf. Wynne, 1992, p. 114-9; developed farther in Jerónimo, 2010). In our
view, the notion of “animal spirits” touches on the idea of indeterminacy, given that
both are opposed to the reductionist vision of social life which is governed only by strict
rationality. To the same end, it might also be possible to draw on theories which other
notable figures in the social sciences have developed, but this is not the place to pursue
those: Vilfredo Pareto’s “non-logic actions” and “derivations and residues”, Thorstein
Veblen “buoyancy”, Max Weber’s “paradox of consequences”, Robert Merton’s “unan-
ticipated consequences”.
Even when environmental problems undergo proper risk analysis assessment,
conjoining the understanding of them with risk has the disadvantage that it neglects
their complexity, the many layers involved, and significant political, psycho-social and
ethical aspects. Such analyses often go beyond the language of probabilistic risk and do
describe uncertainties, but these are designated epistemic uncertainties, and thus “en-
shrine the notion that the inadequate control of environmental risks is due only to
inadequate scientific knowledge, and exclusive attention is focused on intensifying that
knowledge, to render it more precise” (Wynne, 1992, p. 118, original emphasis). Play-
ing on words, it is thus assumed that the “absence of evidence of damage” is equivalent
to “evidence of the absence of damage”. This way, the lack of conclusive empirical evi-
dence of the harmfulness of a given phenomenon tends to be interpreted in a positive
fashion, and this produces a false equivalence of epistemic uncertainty and ignorance
with absence of risk. In actual fact, however, these are events for which there is no
basis on which to assess probabilities, nor is it possible to know the complex and intri-
cate set of potential consequences and networked interconnections. They embody
“severe uncertainties”, in the sense that their impact, if they occur, extends over a “con-
stellation of seven predicates”, as listed by Martins (2011 [1998], p. 211): they are un-
foreseeable, cumulative, profound, long, invisible, latent and irreversible.
The systematic association of environmental problems with the concept of risk
is well illustrated in the vast panoply of forecasting instruments, such as modelling
projections, matrixes, impact chains and projections of different future scenarios.
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Possible futures are advanced, possible disastrous events are projected, but the prob-
ability that any one of them will occur is neglected, as is the possibility that something
never even imagined may happen as a result of the inherent randomness of the natural
world and the contingencies involved in social and institutional behaviour. Moreover,
based on those instruments, certain events may surprisingly become part of a logic of
financialization. Climate insurance is an example: this includes “weather derivatives”,
“environmental mortgages”, “forest-backed securities”, “wetlands compensation in-
struments” and “catastrophe bonds” or “cat bonds”.10 The latter, for example, were
set up in the 1990s, promoted by the OECD and the World Bank itself, and have at-
tracted increasing numbers of investors. The interest in them derives from the par-
ticular circumstance that they are not related to State-issued debt or to general trends
in world markets, but rather to the possible damage and loss caused by natural disas-
ters (e.g. hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, typhoons, thunderstorms, ice storms, large-
scale fires) in densely populated areas. Their aim is to spread the natural risks over
space and time. States transfer to speculative instruments costs which they would, in
the event of a tragedy, have to deal with by raising taxes and by recourse to the principle
of national solidarity. And the financial modelling agencies incorporate nature into
their mathematical models: “In accordance with variables such as wind speed, size of
cyclones, temperatures and physical characteristics of the area in question (building
materials, type of terrain, population), they assess the cost of a catastrophe, and the
extent of the claims that the insurance companies will pay out. And, consequently, they
determine the price of the cat bond” (Keucheyan, 2014, p. 35).11
What we are witnessing here is a process of “commodification of contingency”
or the use of risk as “a calculation of exposure to contingency” (Dillon, 2008). This
process is extending to all the areas within reach of technoscience, from life forms to
cyberspace. For example, the commodification of the biological world, made possible
by the convergence of biological advances and the market, is creating a “global capital-
ist bioeconomy”, which is driving “a market in biotechnological futures” or a “market
in all biotechnological possibilities”, in the language of José Luís Garcia (2006). In
this domain, life itself becomes an economic good, over which the large corporations
10 The Carbon Market (in other words, the market for the purchase and sale of licences to emit carbon dioxide and
carbon credits), which was implemented with the Kyoto Protocol with the aim of reducing greenhouse gases, also
follows the logic of financial markets and stock exchanges.
11 This same author recounts the recent discussion over creating a derivative linked to the disappearance of species
(“species swap”). Under this scheme, firms which help to preserve biodiversity would see their profits increase.
“Let us imagine that the state of Florida signs a species swap contract with a firm, based on a variety of turtle under
threat which lives in the vicinity of the contracting state. If the number of turtle specimens increases as a result of
the firm’s efforts, the state will pay it interest; but if the turtles become scarce, or extinct, the firm must pay the state,
so that it may embark on an operation to save them” (Keucheyan, 2014: 36).
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claim ownership, patent and exploitation rights, and which feeds future expectations
forecast as being plausible. This logic of commodification reminds us of the oxymoron
by which “cat bonds” are known: “Act of God bonds”. They may well be acts of God,
even though God clearly does not play the stock market.
It is a well-known fact that the development of science increased the range of
predictable events and provided a greater sense of security, as far as, for example, the
forecasting of certain natural disasters is concerned, but the order and direction of the
world continue to resemble a wheel of fortune, profoundly affected by ontological
indeterminacies. Recognition of the limits of our ability to imagine possible future
events, of general ignorance of the parameters of a complex world, of the possibility of
“surprises” brought about by technological development itself, and knowing that none
of these items can be grasped by probabilities, makes it difficult to accept the expres-
sion “risk society”. In this context, Martins argues that modern-day industrial socie-
ties should be designated “uncertainty societies” or “random societies” or even “de-
mocracies of uncertainty”, given the importance of lay participation in issues which
affect everyone and in relation to which there are uncertainties of all sorts (Martins,
2011 [1998], p. 203). Undoubtedly, such a designation does not mean that uncertainty
can be used as a unified organizing principle for current economic and social circum-
stances. The same is true of risk. As Ramón Ramos (2004) explains, so-called risk so-
cieties contain uncertainties and uncertainty societies contain risks. Uncertainty is
one of the faces of the risk society: it is glimpsed, but not admitted.
2 Think uncertainty, act precautiously
Living and acting in a world which aspires to control randomness but in which uncer-
tainties impose constraints on our ability to carry out calculations and forecasts about
the future leads us to dive into the unknown, in some areas. In markets, where episte-
mological and ontological impossibility prevent reliable estimates of the future re-
sults of investment from being made, economic actors end up behaving under the ae-
gis of those animal spirits, as if they had well-founded and complete calculations and
probabilities. They have confidence, and that very confidence is a risk response which
seeks to avoid or escape from other risks. Like economic actors, political decision-
makers and experts who address complex environmental issues, and are under pres-
sure to provide thoroughly black-or-white responses, tend to act as if they had abso-
lutely solid foundations on which to provide them. They assume that with appropriate
instruments and regulatory measures, risks can be assessed and above all managed
and controlled.
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The decision as to whether such problems, which involve wide-ranging and un-
predictable adverse effects, are analysed in terms of risk or in terms of uncertainty is
not a neutral choice as far as its political implications are concerned. Elsewhere
(Jerónimo, 2010) I have argued that risk is linked to a logic of prevention, while uncer-
tainty is tied to the precautionary principle. These linkages are enshrined in interna-
tional documents, like the two volumes of the European Environment Agency on case
studies of technologies having adverse consequences but whose warning signs were
ignored (EEA, 2001; 2013). While prevention generally leads to a process of mitiga-
tion, negotiation and acceptance of risks, precaution demands that we safeguard against
damage whose level of danger is unknown, and may even lead to the refusal to take
certain techno-economic decisions and actions.
Prevention and precaution both represent a prudent attitude in the face of the
uncertain, but we may add foresight (prévoyance), along the lines suggested by François
Ewald (1997). In this philosopher-jurist’s interpretation, such attitudes developed and
were appreciated in the West in three different historical periods. Foresight charac-
terises the nineteenth century when prudence is envisaged at the individual level on
the basis of responsibility and blame. Damage resulting from human error implies the
right of redress; damage which is random, or the work of destiny, is seen in a fatalistic
way. The twentieth century replaced foresight with prevention, and prudence came to
be seen from the point of view of insurance and compensation. The random ceased to
be seen as something fortuitous and became something identifiable, assessable and
predictable. This is a rational attitude which relies on and trusts science and experts to
render problems objective and measurable. It thus presupposes the notion of risk, in-
viting us to reduce uncertainty to risk and to mitigate the likelihood of its occurrence.
In the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century a new attitude to pru-
dence emerged, precaution. This deals with non-measurable risks and warns of the
possibility of the occurrence of the worst-case scenario. Precaution is not tied to an
individualist ontology as foresight is; it looks at the dangers which may threaten the
whole of humanity, even if this is on a hypothetical level. Although precaution does not
rule out the possibility of compensation for threats which have direct consequences
for individuals, it describes a world in which, in principle, compensation makes no
sense because the threats involved have irreversible consequences.
Generally speaking, the logic of prevention and risk have tended to dominate,
although many recent disasters show the limits of both of them. The possibility that
the disasters which affected New Orleans in 2005 and the area of Fukushima in Japan
in 2011 might occur was well documented, and indeed even lead to some mitigatory
and preventive action. However, those actions took place in a context which not only
devalued radical uncertainty, but even risk itself, thus leaving room for “business as
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usual”. It is a well-known fact that the severity of consequences depends not only on
how strong the biophysical danger is but also on the vulnerability of things built by
human communities (cf. Murphy, 2012). Strictly speaking, moreover, the memory of
this kind of tragedy persists more strongly on account of the short-term and poten-
tially long-term damage inflicted on human communities rather than on account of
the magnitude and strength of the elements of nature. In the case of hurricane Katrina,
which swept through New Orleans, Freudenburg and colaborators (2009) show how
the disaster was magnified, in large measure, by human decisions and actions taken in
the name of economic growth (which they call the “growth machine”) which shaped
the landscape over time, allegedly “improving it” but, at the same time, making it more
vulnerable to the effects of a natural disaster. This story follows a common pattern; “it
is not one of nature striking humans. It is the story about humans striking nature – and
then enduring the tragic consequences” (Freudenburg et al., 2009, p. 170). Likewise
the tsunami which invaded the land on the east coast of Japan, following a violent earth-
quake, took no heed of any of the preventive and protective measures against tsunamis
at the Fukushima nuclear plant, provoking fires and explosions in several reactors,
and the uncontrolled release of radioactive gases (cf. Garcia & Jerónimo, 2013).
Prevention, when it derives from risk analyses which conclude that the risks of
a given unit of technical infrastructure or of environmental problems are acceptable
and that nothing is without risk, is based on an optimistic principle that no problem
will arise from technological practices and systems for which we cannot find a techni-
cal solution in the future. Martins labels this principle, ironically, the “Axiom of
Panglossian Existence”, in which “there are always technological solutions to the prob-
lems engendered by technology” and that “these solutions will appear in time or will
emerge within a timescale which is sufficient to prevent the worst disasters” (2011
[1997-1998], p. 176, original emphasis).12 In other words, current or future technol-
ogy, on its own and without the need for a deeper analysis of causes, a more friendly
posture towards the environment or the creation of low-impact technologies, will re-
solve the problems created by prior technologies. Note that I do not claim here to deny
the importance of the technology factor nor to argue that the technological means is
not sometimes necessary or that it does not solve many problems effectively. What is
required, rather, is to recognize that technology is a contingent factor in a world in
which the damage inflicted on the ecosystem is closely tied to our models of economic
and industrial development, to guidelines for scientific research and technological
innovation and also to the unforeseeable potentialities of technologies.
12 A good critical analysis of this endless cycle of problems-solutions-problems, in connection with chemical prod-
ucts, is to be found in Colborn; Dumanoski and Myers (1996).
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Although it is true that the great panoply of risk analyses (e.g. risk assessment,
cost-benefit analysis, environmental impact assessments, environmental audits, etc.)
are based on reliable empirical evidence, that is not the same thing as stating that they
represent an exhaustive analysis of the problems or that they do not favour certain val-
ues. As Hugh Lacey (2010) shows, values are precisely the factor which explains the
emphasis on the exploitation of the possibilities of certain phenomena. Modern sci-
ence is imbued with values (capital, market and military) which interact and mutually
reinforce the “modern valuation of control”. Associating things with these values and
adopting on a massive scale research strategies which Lacey calls “materialist” and
“decontextualized” means that events are reduced to their quantitative expressions and
are taken out of their human, social and ecological contexts. In order to achieve a
broader understanding of things, and to consider in all their complexity the conse-
quences they may have on human experience and social organization, a great variety of
strategies are required, including “contextualized” ones which make new approaches
and partnerships possible. The logic of precaution and uncertainties seems to be closer
to that broader approach, which takes into account different types of sensibility and is
open to multiple points of view, as well as having a more participative focus which is
not confined to expert technical analysis. There is no denying, however, that uncer-
tainty may be “manipulated”, in the sense of being exaggerated and magnified (in or-
der to avoid taking decisions and to justify a moratorium) or indeed minimized (in
order to encourage action).
As a civilization, we subject ourselves to several serious forms of danger, for
guarding against which we do not have sufficient or secure foundations. An example of
this is chemical substances which are launched into the atmosphere every day with no
precise knowledge of their effects on public health or the environment. Expectations,
on which decisions depend, are built up on the basis of risk analyses and on a determi-
nation of “acceptable” exposure. “It is hoped” that dangers below that threshold of ac-
ceptability will turn out to be truly harmless. This attitude, which in the final analysis
is the permission of risk, fails to take into account our ignorance of potential adverse
effects, and the indeterminacy of social behaviours, of technical systems and even of
nature. The rationality of risk analyses collapses, because they conceive of things as
physical entities which exist independently of the individuals and institutions which
analyse and experience them (cf. Wynne, 1987). Many so-called serious risks have
tended to be seen as “non-events” – “not just unfortunate, but uncommon, unexpected,
unplanned, uncontrollable” (Hewitt apud Freundenburg et al., 2009, p. 8). This is im-
portant, at a time of increasing human influence over patterns which we previously
called “natural”. One of the assumptions of the notion of risk is its focus on human
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action, which means that neither the force of tragic natural events nor the indetermi-
nacies of technical systems are taken into consideration – in other words, the open
possibilities of technical objects (i.e. those which are not totally foreseeable or con-
trollable). While it is true that many of the events taking place in the natural and social
world bear the mark of human action, not all of them are provoked or attributable to it.
“Are there still any natural disasters?”, asks Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2006) – in other words,
is there moral equivalence between a natural evil and an event provoked by man, a moral
evil, such as for example the persistent ecological damage that is being done by man, or
a terrorist attack? In this French philosopher’s interpretation, it was the plan to con-
trol nature that put us in a position where there are apparently no more natural disas-
ters. If “nature becomes (…) entirely that which we make of it, then clearly there is
nothing external, and everything in the world will sooner or later reflect that which
men did or did not do, did or did not desire or, by contrast, that which they neglected”
(2006, p. 1188). But to posit an anthropological definition of disaster does not mean
ruling out its natural aspects. Although many ecological disasters are a combination of
natural and moral evil, it is crucial to make clear distinctions among them, in order to
determine that which can be strictly put down to human responsibility, so that we may
reverse those disasters through political action and thus not fall into despair, nor into
an exaggerated constructivism in which every contingency or any aspect of externality
is attributed to human action.
3 Risk as a device for ratifying the techno-scientific model
I suggest, as part of my critique, that the language of risk is to be interpreted as a device
for rationalizing the features of the prevailing techno-structure and technological-sci-
entific model in our society, and thus gives rise to evaluation practices which hardly go
further than ratifying the status quo. Risk makes it possible to extend the effective ap-
plication of the technologies and the techno-science responsible for the problems
which are subsequently designated as risks. It does not question their foundational
assumptions or the various tendencies embedded in the instrumental point of view
with which modernity is strongly impregnated. It not only adjusts itself to the model
which generates the problems, it also legitimises, justifies and ratifies them. Along
these same lines of reasoning, Dominique Pestre asserts that risk “first of all masks
the uncontrolled acceleration of a technical progress which it is left to innovators and
experts to manage and to evaluate” (Pestre, 2013, p. 138-9). Even Beck, who, contrary
to what I have argued, makes no distinction between risk and uncertainty, recognizes
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that there is a “cosmetics of risk”, “not a preventive but a symbolic industry and policy
of eliminating the increase in risks” (Beck, 1992 [1986], p. 57), and a coping with the
symptoms rather than an addressing of the risks as causes or origins of the problems.
Under the aegis of the risk approach, events and their multiple complexities and
opaque interactions are reduced to probabilities and to a value which, being scientifi-
cally acceptable, makes their acceptance by society legitimate. Historically this extend-
ing rather than questioning of certain prevailing attitudes in the technological and
scientific system of production, by means of the language of risk, can be seen as em-
bodying a history of “small disinhibitions”, in which there is first a recognition of the
dangers and secondly their normalization or acceptance through change in people’s
perceptions and behaviour. The expression comes from the historian of science Jean-
Baptiste Fressoz (2012) who, in an analysis of risk over the long term, shows how the
history of modern Western society is not a history of unconscious change in its context,
but rather one of successful construction of the devices which produced the dis-
inhibitions of modernity and the climate of “happy apocalypse” in which we live. In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when the idea of progress was still the pre-
vailing matrix, modernization was already being discussed in terms of risks, uncer-
tainties, the fallibility of science and man’s responsibility for nature. The legitimisation
of technological achievements takes place a posteriori, aided by a series of mechanisms
such as regulations, safety standards, courts, administrative supervision, health sur-
veys, and insurance.
A significant contributory factor in this process of “disinhibition” was the de-
valuation of radical uncertainty and its artificial conversion into merely epistemic un-
certainties, which could be analysed using quantitative methods, with the aim of achiev-
ing public credibility and acceptance. But sometimes not even epistemic uncertainty
is acknowledged. This is the phenomenon which could be called “uncertainty intoler-
ance”. In recent research on the regulation of transgenics, or genetically modified or-
ganisms, Asselt and Vos (2008), the originators of the concept, conclude that in re-
ports by both Monsanto and the GMO Panel of the European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA), “uncertainties are not acknowledged, deemed irrelevant, or are simply evaded,
instead of genuinely and systematically investigated” (2008, p. 284). In Monsanto’s
case, the intolerance can be observed not only in the manner in which it addresses the
problem in its reports (carrying out “safety assessments” instead of “risk assessments,”
and thereby deliberately avoiding the language of uncertainty), but above all in the con-
cealment of potentially damaging uncertainty data. According to data put forward by
the authors, results on tests of transgenic corn MON863 carried out on rats in Decem-
ber 2002 showed unexplained damage to the liver, but those results were deemed ir-
relevant by Monsanto, and were not included in the assessment report published in
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August of the following year. The EFSA on the other hand, which merely carries out
meta-analysis of Monsanto’s assessments, ends up corroborating that uncertainty-
devaluing approach.
There are at least two areas where there are significant political and normative
implications of whether radical uncertainty is weighed up and assessed or not. First, as
Sanjay Reddy suggests, the subsumption of uncertainty in probabilistic risk “diverts
attention from the truly radical and irreducible nature of our ignorance about the fu-
ture world, which makes of it in turn an irreducibly political space” (1996, p. 242).
When events which affect society as a whole and have potentially irreversible effects
are being assessed, science should not be the only voice to be heard, nor should it be
used as justification for obstructing other contributions and non-scientific criteria.
In fact science, like other criteria, is necessarily partial, and that partiality increases
the greater the uncertainty inherent in the context. That context, however, demands
not that we do without science, but rather that science enter into a dialogue with other
areas. Any retreat by the political and truly democratic elements in the face of techno-
logical solutions or economic and industrial interests will always have serious conse-
quences for humanity as a whole.
Secondly, and given that, as we have seen above, uncertainty is inherent in the
natural world and in human agency, and because however much knowledge increases,
so too does ignorance, we should adopt a humble posture as far as the human ability to
forecast and control the world is concerned. In many cases, the most we can hope to
achieve is to improve our ability to explain (Pellizzoni, 2010). In addition, it cannot be
denied that there is a small group of large corporations, industrial sectors and even
stock markets all with strong economic interests.13 Expectations of immediate returns,
with costs stretching into the distant future, tend to encourage the acceptance of risks
rather than precautionary policies (Murphy, 2012, p. 24). It is important to recall that
there is a positive interpretation to the very concept of “animal spirits”, which I have
evoked here, in that it helps to avoid inaction in situations of grave uncertainty. How-
ever, that impulse to act – which may be creative and inventive and is therefore not to
be related back to forecasts – is not a one-way street. Innovative action may be directed
towards commercial projects which demand massive exploitation of natural resources,
regardless of whether they produce potential inequalities, damage to the environment
or threats to life on earth. Or it may be an opportunity for “reversing the socio-techni-
cal approach” (Gras, 2012, p. 181), and redirecting economies, national policies and
(low-impact, reversible, recyclable) technological innovations towards equitable val-
ues, human well-being and maintaining equilibrium with nature, the animal world
13 See the examples of GMOs in Amazonia and of Big Pharma, as explained by Garcia (2006).
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and future generations. In visions such as Sagoff’s there is a belief that the proper com-
promise may lie somewhere between the reductionism of markets and the idealism of
politics, between what we choose and what we are willing to pay as consumers (in mar-
kets, each individual follows his own idea of what “a good life” is) and that which we
nevertheless value as citizens (as members of a community, we discuss and look for “a
good society”) (Sagoff, 1988). In any event, many environmental problems can and
should be approached through changes in political and social attitudes and not merely
through technologies, even alternative technologies, as is argued in much “green” capi-
talist theory.
Given the magnitude of current dilemmas, we need to pay close attention to the
fact that political decision-making by governments is increasingly dominated by short-
term thinking, short-term calculation and short-term commitments, and to the he-
gemony of scientific operability, which assumes that problems which are ethical and
political can be dealt with exclusively in technical terms. In relation to events which
have arisen as a result of the environmental crisis and complex technological systems,
we have every reason to believe that the excessive trust placed in merely technical so-
lutions, the abstract, decontextualized strategies of techno-science and the strong in-
fluence of the financial and corporate world urgently need to be circumvented by the
idea of reasonableness, in addition to rationality, that it should be acknowledged that
uncertainties cannot be tamed, and that ethical values and political action should me-
diate techno-economic progress.
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